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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if them are efficiencies to be gained by using credit vendor
database address lead information in order to locate and apprehend deserters from the Department of
Defense. A pilot program was performed by the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point, which used
address leads supplied by three nationwide credit vendors - CBI (Equifax), TRW, and TU (Trans
Union). As a result of using this information, the Army returned to military custody one hundred
thirty-five deserters, including nine of forty-six (20 percent) of the missing deserters who had
additional military charges. The study determined a more effective and efficient manner of locating
deseiters would be to utilize address lead information from two nationwide credit vendors (CBI and
TRW). Multiple credit vendor use is recommended based on the demonstrated strengths and
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Even in an all volunteer service, deserters remain a
problem for the military. Their skills need to be replaced
and their "selective departures" have an undesirable effect on
morale and performance of their unit. Consequently, laws have
been passed in the United States which make desertion a
criminal offense, and the military services expend resources
to return deserters to military control. This study attempts
to identify a more efficient and effective method of locating
missing deserters and returning them to military control.
Although as shown in the chart in Appendix B [Ref. 4] the
total number of deserters has declined from 22,833 in
September 1981 to 6,898 in September 1991, desertion of
service members remains a problem in an all-volunteer service.
In addition, if at some point in the future the Department of
Defense is tasked to perform duties that are not popular with
a significant portion of its service members, the number of
deserters may once again increase to previous levels found
during the Viet Nam War era. Costs directly attributed to
deserters incurred by the Department of Defense include a
Deserter Information Point (DIP) established within each
service that provides for control, accounting, and
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distribution of information concerning members classified as
deserters.[Ref. 1] Other costs such as controlling and
retraining deserters, and losses from recruitment and training
expenditures were delineated in a study done in 1977.
Discharging deserters in absentia was also examined by that
study, and it was found to be not cost effective as well as
providing no deterrent effect on other military personnel
considering desertion. [Ref. 2] A 1976 Air Force Military
Personnel Center study calculated the fiscal year 1975
absentee and deserter costs for 6,645 offenders at $321 per
offender. These costs were based on direct costs such as
salary cost per year and indirect costs that included
personnel salaries managing absentee information, data
management costs, and escort and travel costs.[Ref. 31 The
breakdown of deserters reported to the Defense Manpower Data
Center as of September 30, 1991, is as follows: Army-2810,
Navy-1894, Marine Corps-1989, and Air Force-205.
In the present study information available from commercial
credit vendors will be examined to find its effectiveness in
locating deserters. As of January 1993, only the Navy uses a
credit vendor to locate deserters and the Navy only uses one
of the three national credit vendors operating in the United
States. All services are required by Department of Defense
Directive to make every practicable effort to apprehend
absentees and deserters as expeditiously as possible. The
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legality of using the credit vendor information with respect
to the Fair Credit Reporting Act [Ref. 6] will be addressed.
There are three primary credit vendors in the United
States. CBI, also known as Equifax, is located in Atlanta,
Georgia. TRW is located in California, and Trans Union, also
known as TU, is located in Chicago, Illinois. These services
are accessible through tape to tape transfers or through
personal computers using software available from the vendors.
A description of the different types of software available,
hardware requirements, and the source(s) for the software are
shown in Reference 7 :p. 8-10. In addition to address and name
verification reports from credit vendors, specific cases may
warrant a more indepth search to locate a deserter. In such
cases, credit vendors also have full credit reports available
if the requestor meets one of the following conditions:
1. A court order or a grand jury subpoena.
- or -
2. A signed authorization from the consumer.
- or -
3. Meeting one of the permissible purposes:
a. Credit related matter.
b. Employment purposes.
c. Underwriting insurance.
d. Determining eligibility for license/benefit.
e. Relevant business transactions.
[Ref. 6:p. 1054]
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Full credit reports list the firms with whom the
individual has open credit accounts and has recently applied
for credit. This permits the holder to those contact sources
to find out more information about the recent activities of
the person in question. This could be useful in locating a
deserter if, for example, the deserter applied for credit at
a department store an1d the information on the store's credit
application gives more timely address and employer information
on the subject.
In addition to the credit vendors dealt with in this
study, there are numerous other sources of information that
may be useful for locating individuals. These services are
available at a wide range of costs. The databases vary in
size and criteria. The sources for information used by these
commercial databases are sources such as, but not limited to,
telephone listings, utility company customer listings, census
results, warranty card registration, and real estate
ownership. A listing of many of those commercial databases,
their availability, and a general description of their content
can be found in Reference 7.
It will be shown that by using a method of locating
deserters not currently in widespread use, the Department of
Defense could return to military control a greater number of
its deserters with minimal cost. The utility of this approach
is assessed through use of a pilot test during which the
4
proposed method was actually used to locate deserterL; from the
U.S. Army.
B. OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this study is to determine the utility of
using credit vendor data to help locate deserters. In order
to accomplish that objective, a pilot study was conducted
using deserters at large from the Army. As previously stated,
of the four services, only the Navy currently uses information
available from credit vendors in their deserter apprehension
program. Data provided by the credit vendors was compared to
the information the Army DIP had in each member's file to find
if there were any new leads provided concerning the deserter's
present locale. To find out if there was "value" added by
using information supplied by more than one credit vendor,
apprehension files were examined to see if the information
leading to apprehension was supplied by all three national
credit vendors. Each vendor's information wLs judged for its
usefulness, as measured by whether it whether it included an
address lead that actually resulted in an apprehension of a
deserter.
C. QUESTIONS
Given the legal constraints on the use of information
contained in credit reports, what credit vendor information,
if any, can the Department of Defense legally use to assist in
5
the deserter apprehension process? As previously noted, there
are currently three major credit vendors: TRW, CBI, and Trans
Union (TU). Do all three supply equally useful information
across the country or do they have regional areas of strength
and weaknesses? Which of the three vendors provided the
information that lead to the most apprehensions? Can cost
savings or other efficiencies for the Department of Defense be
realized by using information from more than one credit
venrlor?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study is limited to the examination of 2,199 U.S.
Army deserter records provided by the DIP at Fort Benjamin
Harrison, Indiana. To stay within legal constraints, only
name and address information was acquired from the three
credit vendors. A computer literature search was performed
on Dialog and DLSIE using the key words, "Deserter,
Unauthorized Absentee, and Absent Without Leave (AWOL) .'
Studies not referenced by those databases or not falling under
the key words utilized did not come to the attention of the
author.
Z. METHODOLOGY
All of the data used to conduct this study was supplied by
the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point (USADIP), Fort
Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The primary identities were the
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names and social security numbers of the 2,199 deserters
identified by the USADIP. A questionnaire was used to help
compare the deserter's addresses previously noted in each
member's records to the address leads provided by the credit
vendors. The information in the deserters' records was
matched separately for each vendor using the deserter's social
security number and name to ensure that the address
information corresponded to the right individual. A new
address lead match occurred whenever a credit vendor supplied
an address that was not already contained in the member's
desertion packet at the DIP. The total number of address lead
matches provided by each vendor was identified. All of the
ne-w address leads were used by DIP when attempting to locate
each of the deserters. The new address lead matches were
compared to those supplied by the other two vendors to find
out whether that address information was available from more
than one of the sources. Matches leading directly to a member
returning to military custody were identified as to its
particular vendor source. The questionnaire used to gather
the aforementioned data is shown in Appendix A and explained
in Chapter IV.
F. DFINITIONS
Absentee. Any member of the Armed Forces not classified
administratively as a deserter who is absent without authority
7
from his or her unit, organization, or other place of duty at
which he or she is required to be.[Ref. 5]
Credit Vendor (Consumer Reporting Agency). Any entity
that engages in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers
so consumer reports can be given to third parties.[Ref. 6]
Deserter. A member of the Armed Forces who has been
administratively classified as a deserter. Within the
Department of Defense policy are three separate criteria that
cause an absentee to be administratively classified as a
deserter:
1. Without regard to the length of absence, the facts and
circumstances of absence indicate the member committed the
offense of desertion as defined in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial.
2. The member has been absent without leave for thirty
consecutive days.
3. The member requests, applies for, or accepts any type
of asylum or residence permit in a foreign country while
absent without authority in that country. There is no
regard to the length of absence in this criteria.[Ref. 1]
Desertion. The UCMJ definition of desertion is found in
Article 85. Its definition applies to either "any member" or
"commissioned officer" of the armed forces. Any member is
guilty of desertion--if that member without authority goes or
remains absent from his organization or place of duty with
intent to remain away permanently; or quits his organization
or place of duty with intent to avoid hazardous duty or shirk
important service; or without being separated from the armed
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forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or
another armed force or enters a foreign armed service except
when authorized by the United States. In addition to the
above, the commissioned officer is also guilty of desertion if
after tendering his resignation and before notice of its
acceptance, he quits his post or proper duties with intent to
remain away permanently.[Ref. 51
Deserter Under Aggravated Circumstances. Those cases of
desertion where the individual is an officer, is wanted for
selected offenses punishable under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice or has had access to classified defense
information which, if disclosed, could jeopardize the security
interests of the United States.[Ref. 51
Return to Military Control. The date and hour:
a. An absentee or deserter surrenders to, is delivered
to, or is apprehended by or for military authorities, or
b. A civilian authority holding the absentee or deserter
for some reason other than at the request of the military
informs the military of his or her availability; or
c. An absentee or deserter otherwise comes under the
control of military personnel.[Ref. 1]
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II. BACKGROUND
After a member is administratively classified as a
deserter, each service is required to enter the deserter
information into the FBI National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) computer database. A Deserter Information Point has
been established within each service to act as the "clearing
house" within the each Military Service for deserters.
Members of the Armed Forces may apprehend deserters under
certain circumstances prescribed in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. Civil authorities may also apprehend
military deserters. The authority for civil authorities to
apprehend deserters is found in United States Code Title 10.
Specifically in Section 808 Of Title 10, "any civil officer
having authority to apprehend offenders under the laws of the
United States or of a State, Territory, Commonwealth, or
possession, or the District of Columbia may summarily
apprehend a deserter from the armed forces and deliver him
into the custody of those forces."[Ref. 5] The services are
to forward any leads developed pertaining to the location of
deserters to the appropriate civil law enforcement authorities
who will be asked to help in the return of the service member
to military control. No credit vendor database information is
currently used by the Army for leads to locating deserters.
The Navy uses only CBI's information in its apprehension
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program. The Air Force and Marines do not routinely use any
credit vendor database information. The military services are
responsible for sustaining a level of coordination with
civilian law enforcement agencies to promote their active
participation in this program. Upon apprehension by civil
authorities, the military shall try to return the absentee to
military control within forty-eight hours of being notified.
1i
III. LAWS. DIRECTIVES, AND INSTRUCTIONS REVIEW
The offense of desertion is defined in Title 10 of the
United States Code. Title 10 contains the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) within its sections. Article 85 of
the UCMJ specifically defines desertion (shown in the previous
definition's chapter) for the Armed Forces of the United
States. The law also requires that each member of the Armed
Forces shall have the article on desertion carefully explained
to them when they enter the service, after completing six
months of service, and at the time a member reenlists.
Section 956 of Title 10 permits Department of Defense
appropriated funds to be used for expenses for apprehension
and delivery of deserters, including payments of rewards not
to exceed $75 for apprehensions.
Administrative policy on deserters for the Department of
Defense (DOD) is set forth in DOD Directive Number 1325.2,
Desertion and Unauthorized Absence. This directive applies by
agreement to the Coast Guard as well as to the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines. Each service carries out the DOD
Directive using its own policies, regulations, and
instructions that are based upon the DOD Directive. DOD and
individual service regulations and instructions are for
administrative purposes only. Legal charges are based on
United States Code, Title 10.
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Also found within United States Code is Title 15 Section
1681b concerning the permissible purposes of consumer reports.
Although the release of consumer reports to governmental
agencies is not specifically addressed in Section 1681b,
Section 1681f does address disclosure of address lead
information to governmental agencies. Section 1681f states,
a consumer reporting agency may furnish identifying
information respecting any consumer, limited to his name,
address, former addresses, places of employment, or former
places of employment, to a governmental agency. [Ref. 6]
Based on this statement the use of specific and limited credit
vendor information to locate deserters from the Department of
Defense is permissible by law.
This chapter has encompassed the legal basis for the
offense of desertion and current surrounding policies. The
next chapter describes the questionnaire used in the study a-.d
the results it produced.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Army Deserter Information Point (USADIP) at Fort
Benjamin Harrison, Indiana was chosen as the research site for
this study. The USADIP provided the names and social security
numbers of all 2,199 Army deserters who were at-large on
December 8, 1992. The total number of deserters-at-large is
in a constant state of flux. On any given day some deserters
may be arrested or turn themselves in, while other AWOL
personnel may be declared deserters. A chart in Appendix B
shows the number of deserters-at-large in the Department of
Defense from fiscal years 1985 to 1991.
Each of the 2,199 deserters were identified by name and
social security number. This information was forwarded by the
U.S. Army to three credit vendors--TRW, CBI, and Trans Union
(TU) -- for matching with their databases. A paper printout was
produced for each vendor showing the deserter's name and
social security number along with any address lead information
contained in their database. If a social security number was
linked to a different name than the name provided by the
USADIP, the accompanying name and address information was also
provided on the printout.
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The printouts were compared against the individual
deserter packets to decide if all of the address lead
information provided by the credit vendor was already
contained in the file. To facilitate the recording of this
information, a questionnaire (shown in Appendix A) was filled
out for each deserter. The structure and content of the
questionnaire filled out by personnel at the USADIP is
described in the following paragraphs.
B. QUESTIONNAIRE STRUCTURE
Question number one reads, "Is member a special category?
Yes_ No_, if yes, what category? " Only two special
categories were used. They were:
1. DVIS-II, a person that deserted from the Army during
the Viet Nam era.
2. DEFECTOR, a person that sought political asylum in a
foreign country whether the country is friendly or hostile,
and voluntarily resides in a foreign country whether the
country is friendly or hostile.
Question number two reads, "Total number of addresses
provided by the following vendors: TRW#_ CBI#_ Trans Union
(TU)#_.m This question simply asks for the total number of
address leads provided by each vendor. This question does not
screen or qualify what the address must be other than if two
exactly the same addresses were printed out from the vendor,
they would be counted as only one address.
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Question number three reads, "Does name provided coincide
with deserter packet (yes or no)? (If all responses are no,
questionnaire is complete). TRW_ CBI_ TU_ ." This question
begins to qualify the addresses provided by the credit
vendors. It is asking whether the name provided by the credit
vendor matches the name provided by the Army from the deserter
record. One of the reasons for the names not matching is that
the deserter was a female who married and changed her last
name. There were also instances of individuals using social
security numbers other than their own. If the name provided
did not match the packet, the questionnaire was continued only
if the persons completing the questionnaire felt there was
some link between the credit vendor information and the
information contained in the deserter packet on the service
member.
Question number four reads, "All address information
provided by credit vendor is already available in member's
packet: Yes_ (if yes, questionnaire is complete) No_ (if
no, continue), a. Total addresses of credit vendor different
than member's packet/addresses common to other vendor(s):
TRW#_ TRW/CBI#_ TRW/TU#, CBI#_ CBI/TRW#_ CBI/TU#,
TU#_ TU/TRW#_ TU/CBI#_." If there were no addresses
different from the deserter's packet, the questionnaire is
complete. The first part of the question inquired whether all
the information supplied by the credit vendor was already in
the deserter's file. The second portion of the question
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inquired how many addresses provided by the credit vendor were
different from the member's record and if the addresses were
unique or common to those provided by the other two vendors.
Question number five reads, "Information from following
vendor provided positive lead on member: (N) - Name, (A) -
Address, (B) - Both, TRW__ CBI_ TU_._" This question further
qualifies the address information the vendor provided. Here
"name" refers to potential alias names the vendor may have
provided.
Question number six reads, "Member has additional military
charges: Yes_ No_ .2" This specifically refers to military
charges that are recorded in the member's packet at the USADIP
at the time of the questionnaire was completed on that member.
Question number seven reads, "Address from following
vendor used to apprehend member. TRW__ CBI_ TJ__* " After
vendor supplied address lead information was judged to be
different from that available in the member's desertion
packet, the address and/or name information was forwarded from
USADIP to the appropriate civilian authority for potential
apprehension. If there was an apprehension or action
resulting in the member returning to the military, the
appropriate vendor was credited with providing that
information. If the same information was provided by more
than one vendor, each vendor providing the information was
given credit.
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Question number eight reads, "Zip code that member was
located in upon apprehension (use only 5 digit zip code)."
When service member apprehensions occurred that were directly
attributable to information provided by one or more credit
vendor. The zip code was entered where the deserter was
located at the time of apprehension.
Question number nine reads, "Subject has been returned to
military custody code: ." Besides the service members
being returned to military custody due to information provided
by credit vendors, there were also members who returned to the
military after the member information was sent to the credit
vendors, but before working on the questionnaire. Other
members were returned to military custody after the
questionnaire was being worked on, but not because of the
address lead information supplied by the credit vendors. An
example of a situation falling in this category would be if
the deserter was apprehended during a routine traffic stop due
to information on the National Criminal Information Computer
(NCIC). Deserter information is routinely entered in the NCIC
database whenever a member is declared a deserter as required
by Department of Defense policy.
C. CATZGORZf S OF DISIRTIRS
A brief description of the different categories of
deserters included in the Army population studied is presented
in the following paragraphs. The analysis of the primary
18
research questions addressed by this study appears in the next
chapter.
There was a total of 2,199 deserters-at-large at the
beginning of the study. As deserters were returned to
military custody, they were placed in three categories as
previously discussed. This study assumed that the procedures
and policies of the Department of Defense on deserters were
operating according to current directives prior to the study.
Such policies include forwarding a deserter's information to
the National Criminal Investigative Computer (NCIC) network.
It is assumed that upon receiving updated information from the
NCIC the civilian authorities took the appropriate action with
respect to the applicable United States laws. Within the
three categories of deserters returned to military custody,
this study focused on the deserters returned directly
attributable to credit vendor supplied information. The other
two categories of returned deserters were excluded from
further analysis.
Of the total number of deserters, 119 of the deserters
were on administrative hold. This group includes cases that
were being held for correction of a deserter's documentation
and/or incomplete documentation. The first category of
returned deserters contained 296 deserters that were returned
to military custody (RMC) before using any credit vendor
information to locate the member. As each questionnaire was
completed using information found in the member's packet, a
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control date was assigned. The deserters returned to military
custody prior to the control date recorded on the
questionnaire were not included in the analysis. The second
category of returned deserters contained 50 who were returned
to military custody (RMC) after the control date found on the
questionnaire but the cause for apprehension was unrelated to
the credit vendor (CV) information. This category includes
deserters apprehended through a check of the NCIC while being
detained for traffic stops or arrests due to civilian charges.
The third category of returnees and the focus of this study
contained 135 members who were returned to military custody
(RMC) as a direct result of the address leads supplied by the
credit vendors. Subtracting the above numbers from the
beginning total gives a total of 1,598 deserters-at-large left
at the end of this study as shown in Table I.
TABLE I - U.S. ARMY DESERTERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
STUDY
Deserters at Large 2,199
Beginning
RMC Prior co Study 296
RMC Not Due to CV Info 50
RMC Due to CV Info 135
Deserters at Large Final 1,598
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As previously noted, however, the actual number of deserters
in the Army is constantly fluctuating because of new
desertions. The precise number is unimportant for purposes of
the study and the figure of 1,598 is shown here only to
provide the reader with an idea of the magnitude of the
problem and to help gauge the relative proportions of the
different categories of deserters occurring in the Army.
The groups of deserters other than those returned to
military custody due to credit vendor information, were
examined because they were of interest to the USADIP. Those
groups are discussed here. Of the 2,199 deserters, 165 were
in special categories as defined by the USADIP. The 165 broke
into the two subcategories of defectors and Viet Nam era
(DVIS-II) deserters. Thirty-six deserters were in the
defector subcategory. The credit vendor database search
provided no address or name information that was not already
on file for the defectors. The remaining 129 were in the
DVIS-II subcategory. Of the 129 member DVIS-II group, six
deserters (21 percent) had address or name information
provided by the credit vendors and two of those six deserters
were returned to military custody directly attributable to the
credit vendor information.
Fifty (2.27 percent) of the 2,199 deserters had
additional military charges on file in their packet at the
USADIP. During the study, 13 of those fifty deserters (26
21
percent) were returned to military custody. Further analysis
of the 13 with additional military charges indicated three
deserters (6 percent) were returned before the questionnaire
was completed and one (2 percent) was returned due to other
circumstances not attributable to the credit vendor
information. Nine of the remaining 46 returnees (20 percent)
were returned directly because of the credit vendor address
lead information. Of the nine deserters returned based on
credit vendor address lead information, two were provided
uniquely from TRW, two were uniquely provided from CBI, and
the remaining five were apprehended based on information
provided by two or more of the three vendors.
For each deserter returned due to credit vendor address
lead information, the zip code where the deserter was
apprehended was recorded. The break down of those numbers is
presented in Appendix C. TRW provided information on 93 of
the returned deserters (69 percent). Fourteen (10 percent) of
the 93 were exclusive to TRW. CBI had information on 106 (79
percent) of the 135 returned deserters and 29 (21 percent)of
those were unique to CBI. TU contributed information on 75
(56 percent) of the returnees with four (3 percent) being
unique to TU. Once again, the unique credit vendor address
lead information was provided by only one vendor. The next




This study sought to determine if address leads acquired
from vendors could be used by the United States Army Deserter
Information Point to help locate and apprehend deserters. It
was assumed that if there is utility in using this information
for the U.S. Army that the information will also have value
locating deserters from the other three services.
Of the initial survey population of 2,199 deserters, 415
were excluded from the analysis because they were either on
administrative hold or apprehended before USADIP attempted to
utilize the address leads. This reduced the total study
population to 1,784. The first address leads were processed
by the USADIP on January 28, 1993, and the last ones processed
on April 13, 1993. Although it is recognized that additional
apprehensions may result from the credit vendor address lead
information, a cutoff date of May 13, 1993, was selected.
Any deserters apprehended after that date were not included in
the computations contained in this study. Fifty out of 1,784
deserters (2.8 percent) were returned to military custody
during the duration of the study due to causes other than
obtaining the credit vendor information. The causes for the
apprehension of the 50 returnees were not obtained nor
analyzed for this study. Credit vendor address lead
information accounted for 135 members who were returned to
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military control which constituted 7.6 percent of the eligible
study population. The subset of total returnees that can be
directly attributed to credit vendor information is further
examined in the following paragraphs.
The location of apprehension for the 135 returnees was
recorded on the study questionnaire. The first digit of the
zip code in the United States divides the country into ten
regions as shown in Figure I. The lowest number zip codes are
Figure 1 - First Digit of Zip Code
found in the northeastern continental United States and
progress sequentially as one goes further west. Figure 1
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depicts the areas covered by each of the ten digits (0 to 9)
that can appear as the first digit of a zip code.
Of the 135 deserters returned due to the credit vendor
information, there were no returnees from the zip code
beginning with the number five. The distribution of the
deserters among the apprehension zip codes is shown in Figure
2. Twenty-seven percent of the 135 returnees were apprehended
in locations where the zip code began with the number two.
The locations where the zip codes began with three and seven
were next, each produced 17 percent of the total returnees.
DESERTERS
RETURNED TO MILITARY CUSTODY
40
3 0 ------------------ --------------------------------------------------.
20 .................
0
0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
Figure 2 - Distribution of Apprehensions Within First
Digit of Zip Code
A breakdown of the 135 returned deserters by both
apprehension location and the vendor supplying the address
lead is presented in Appendix C. CBI provided information
leading to the largest number of apprehensions. One hundred
six returnees could have been located if CBI was the only
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vendor used. CBI was the only vendor who supplied address
lead information on 29 of the returnees. TRW was next with
correct address lead information on 92 of those apprehended,
including 14 whose leads were unique to TRW. TU provided
address leads resulting in 75 apprehensions of which four were
unique. Figure 3 shows what the apprehensions would have been
from the study results had various vendor combinations been
used.
When one compares the distributions reported in Appendix
C with the zip codes shown in Figure 1, the relative strengths
and weaknesses that the credit vendors have in different
geographic regions of the United States become apparent. For
example, in zip codes beginning with three, CBI had the
address lead information on 22 out of the 23 deserters who
were apprehended in that region and supplied unique
information on 11 of the 23. This area covers the
southeastern United States and is the location of CBI's
corporate headquarters. TU is based in Chicago, Illinois.
Their traditionally strongest area - Illinois, Wisconsin, and
Michigan - was broken up into three different zip code regions
which makes it difficult to assess their strength in the
Midwest. TRW is based in California. It was the strongest
vendor in regions six, seven, eight and nine, which covered
the sections of the United States west of the Mississippi
River where deserters were found.
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Of the total of 135 deserters returned to military
custody, the credit vendors supplied information on the
following number of returnees: TRW provided information on 93
140
1 2 0 ----- -- ---- ---- ----- -.--.- ---- ---
1 0 0 ------- ------ ---------.--
8 0 _ --- --- -- --.--.--.--
60--------




Figure 3 - Deserters Apprehended If Vendor or Vendor Combinations
Were Used In Study
deserters, CBI provided information on 106, and TU provided
information on 75. Figure 6 illustrates a breakdown of the
135 apprehensions by credit vendor providing the address lead
information. Sixty-five percent of the apprehensions had
information that was common to two or more credit vendors.
CBI was the only vendor supplying information on 21 percent of
the apprehensions, TRW the only vendor on 10 percent, and TU
the only vendor on 3 percent.
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TABLE II - VENDOR PROVIDING ADDRESS LEAD FOR RETURNEES.




CBI & TRW 131 97.0%
CBI & TU 121 89.6%
TRW & TU 106 78.5%
CBI & TRW & TU 135 100%
Table II approaches the numbers on deserters returned to
military custody by the vendors from a different angle. It
shows that if USADIP chose to use information from CBI, the
number of returnees would have been 106 vice the 135 returnees
using all three vendors. With only TRW and CBI information
used, the number of returnees would have increased to 131.
Therefore, it can be concluded that there was a positive
return gained through adding the TRW information due to its
nationwide coverage. For the U.S. Army, using both CBI and
TRW address lead information (as shown in Figure 4) appears to
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be the best combination. Although four returnees would have
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Figure 4 Credit Vendor Study Costs
been missed without using the TU information, the 28 percent
added cost reflected in this study diminishes the positive
return to some extent.
The total number of deserters apprehended as a result of
address leads supplied from the credit vendors includes each
vendor's unique information plus information that was common
to one or more of the other two vendors used in this study.
CBI supplied information on 79 percent of the returnees, TRW
supplied information on 69 percent, and TU provided
information on 56 percent. There is a cost associated with
each set of information provided by a credit vendor as shown
in Table III and the following paragraphs explain some of
those costs.
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TABLE III - VENDOR COSTS VERSUS RETURNED DESERTERS
VENDOR STUDY COST RETURNEES COST PER
(INCLUDES RETURNEE
DUPLICATES)
TRW $2195.00 93 $23.60
CBI $2898.17 106 $27.34
TU $1939.30 75 $25.86
TOTALS $7032.47 135 $52.09
Although specific costs will vary with time and the type
of service contracted for, the actual costs for the address
information at the time of this study are shown here as a
basis for comparison. CBI, also known as Equifax Info
Services, of 1600 Peachtree Street Northwest, Atlanta,
Georgia, 30309, was available at the time of the study on a
General Services Administration contract (GSOOFXI806A). Their
price estimates for the service of tape-to-tape profile
providing an address verification report were $2.26 per record
for a match and $1.00 per record for a nonmatch. The total
CBI costs for this study were $2898.17. TRW Credit Data
Division of 770 Tamalpais Drive, Corte Madera, California,
94925, was also available on a General Services Administration
contract (GSOOF1804A) at the time of this study. Their price
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for the services was $1.10 per record for their address
verification report. The total TRW charges for this study
were $2195.00. Trans Union was not under General Services
Administration contract at the time of this study. Their
charge for providing address information was $1.30 per record
with a match and $.50 per record without a match. Trans Union
study costs were $1939.30. Figure 4 shows the credit vendor
costs for this study. The total cost of $7,032.47 equates to
$52.09 spent for the 135 deserters who were returned to
military custody. As stated in a previous paragraph, a 1976
Air Force Military Personnel Center study showed fiscal year
1975 absentee and deserter costs to be $321 per capita.[Ref.
3:p. 9] Based on the cost of $7,032 for the credit vendor
information and the 1975 Air Force costs per capita for
deserters, the credit vendor information presents an annual
cost savings to the government of approximately $36,000 by
returning deserters to military custody. This dollar figure
is not adjusted for the inflation that occurred since the 1975
Air Force deserter expenses to the government were calculated.
This section has presented the results of the study. The
discussion, conclusions, and recommendations based on those
results is presented in the next section.
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Figuze 5 - One Hundred Thirty-Five Deserter
Apprehensions Broken Down by Credit Vendor Provining
Address Lead Information
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VI. DISCUSSIONS. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Deserters will remain a problem as long as there are
militaries. There is utility in using information available
in credit vendor databases in order to locate and apprehend
deserters from the United States Armed Services. Can the
Departmenr of Defense legally use address information
available from credit vendors? Without any further
qualifications, Section 1681f. which is titled Disclosures to
government agencies of Title 15 of U.S. Code permits name,
address, former addresses, places of employment, or former
places of employment, to be given to government agencies. As
previously noted, by meeting specific criteria of Section
1681b of Title 15, the consumer reporting agency may furnish
a full consumer report. Based on this study's results, name
and address information in many cases is sufficient for the
purpose of locating deserters from the Department of Defense.
One hundred thirty-five deserters were returned to
military custody within the limited time of this study. From
the unique information leading to an apprehension, an increase
in number of deserters returned to military custody of
approximately 50 percent was seen by using address leads
supplied by two vendors instead of just one (i.e., CBI and TRW
versus only CBI). Therefore, it is recommended that the Army
use the two major credit vendors, CBI and TRW, to provide
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location information to assist in the apprehension of
deserters. Each of the credit vendors provides a nationwide
service and appears to have individual strengths and
weaknesses within geographic regions. Whether the two vendors
selected for the Army will also adequately cover the
geographical area pertinent for Navy, Marine, or Air Force
deserters is unknown.
Apprehending deserters using credit vendor information is
more cost efficient and effective for the U.S. Army when
compared to the methods currently in use. It is recommended
that once a deserter is reported to the DIP, that the service
wait for a period of three to six months prior to requesting
credit vendor address lead information in order to allow any
potential new address leads to appear in credit vendor
databases. After the initial request, information should be
requested as a followup at some regular interval (e.g., twelve
months) after the initial check. It is recommended DIP's
monitor the effectiveness of the selected interval in order to
determine the most effective and efficient time frames for
rechecking credit vendor databases for address lead
information.
During the study, certain details of the process of
apprehending the deserter with the credit vendor information
were outside the scope of control of the principal
participants conducting the study. ThoF'e uncontrollable items
were items such as, did all police departments devote the same
34
effort to the attempted apprehension upon receiving the
information from the USADIP; did the police departments treat
this information the same as the information used under the
current policies such as the NCIC; and as previously
mentioned, has the Department of Defense practice of entering
the deserter's information into the NCIC operated according to
the intended policies? This study did not examine the
possible effects that either the period during which a service
member deserted or the location from which the member deserted
may have on locating that member. It also did not consider
the effects any personal attributes of the service member such
as sex, age, race, or pay grade may have on the location
ability of credit vendors to provide useful address leads.
Utilizing credit vendor databases for address lead
information to assist in locating and apprehending deserters
is more cost effective and efficient than methods currently in
use. The relatively small costs of this type of program,
which at a minimum are personal computer software costs and
credit vendor database query charges, are the essential
ingredients to its success. One hundred thirty-five deserters
were returned to military custody as a direct result of the







LAST NAME: FIRST NAME: MI:
SSN: - -
1. IS MEMBER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES? YES NO _ (IF
YES, WHAT CATEGORY: )
2. TOTAL NUMBER OF ADDRESSES PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING
VENDORS: TRW # CBI # TRANS UNION (TU) #
3. DOES NAME PROVIDED COINCIDE WITH DFR PACKET (YES OR NO)?
(IF ALL RESPONSES ARE NO, QUESTIONNAIRE IS COMPLETE).
TRW _ CBI TU
4. ALL ADDRESS INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CREDIT VENDOR IS
ALREADY AVAILABLE IN MEMBER'S PACKET: YES _ (if yes,
questionnaire is complete) NO _ (if no, continue).
a. TOTAL ADDRESSES OF CREDIT VENDOR DIFFERENT THAN
MEMBER'S PACKET/ADDRESSES COMMON TO OTHER VENDOR(s):
CBI# TRW#_ TRW#
TRW # CBI # TU #
TU#_ TU## CBI#
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5. INFORMATION FROM FOLLOWING VENDOR PROVIDED POSITIVE LEAD
ON MEMBER: (N) - NAME(A) - ADDRESS(B) - BOTH
TRW CBI TU _
6. MEMBER HAS ADDITIONAL MILITARY CHARGES:YES NO
------------------------ FOLLOWUP INFORMATION------------------
7. ADDRESS FROM FOLLOWING VENDOR USED TO APPREHEND MEMBER.
TRW - CBI TU
8. ZIP CODE MEMBER LOCATED IN UPON APPREHENSION (use only 5
digit zip code) :
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DUE TO CREDIT VENDOR INFORMATION
ZIP CODE ANALYSIS
ZIP CODE FIRST DIGIT TOTAL UNIQUE TOTAL FROM
0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 TO VENDOR VENDOR
CREDIT VENDOR (of p•sibs" 135) (di possible 135)
TRW UNIQUE 0 2 3 0 I 2 3 1 2 14 TRW
TRW TOTAL 3 7 28 9 11 4 18 4 9 93
CBI UNIQUE 0 2 5 11 3 1 2 0 5 29 CBI
CBITOTAL 2 8 30 22 13 2 17 3 9 106
TU UNIQUE 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 4 TU
TU TOTAL 3 6 26 10 8 1 14 1 6 75
80




CREDIT VENDOR TOTAL STUDY COSTS RMC 'S UNIQUE RMC'S
CBI $2,898.17 106 $27.34 29
TRW $2,195.00 93 $23.60 14
TU $1,939.30 75 $25.86 4
TOTAL RMC COST PER RMC
INCLUDES DUPESFOR STUDY
TOTAL COST $7,032.47 135 $52.09
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